Engaging The Taliban | Trifter

I wan to share this article with all of my followers with y these thoughts, Impressive and very well elaborated article in which you bring the reality in front of us. So the defeat of US which was written on the walls and graveyards of Afghanistan from the day one is very near as I perceived. What about Pakistan? who was saying from 2002 we must engage them through dialogue is proven absolutely right. I am more than 100% convince about Drone Attacks they are counter productive and generating more and more hate against US in Pakistan. More they press Pakistan more they will loose heart and minds of Pakistani peoples.
Now we the youngest generation is thinking how to get rid of these American puppets once for all and close every door of intrusion from US. That day is very much near, every Pakistani knows that.

IMMEDIATELY after Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s recent visit to Islamabad, which focused on making joint efforts to contact the Afghan Taliban, there has been a sudden eruption of claims and counter-claims regarding talks with the militia, bringing into focus the reconciliation process with the Taliban.

The situation in Afghanistan is quite complicated, particularly for Pakistan. Faced with increasing deterioration in the internal law and order situation, organised attacks on border villages from Afghanistan and mounting pressure from the US, Pakistan, no doubt, is ready to go the extra mile to support Karzai’s initiative to end the insurgency.

But prior to making any commitment on behalf of the Taliban, Pakistan needs to undertake a thorough study of the situation in Afghanistan. Today, Pakistan stands demonised in the eyes of common Afghans, thanks to the efforts of the incumbent Afghan regime and its international backers. Again, after exhausting all options of eliminating the Taliban over the last 10 years, the US and the Afghan government have successfully shifted the blame for their collective failure to Pakistan, convincing Afghans that Pakistan is providing safe havens and training facilities to the Taliban across the border.

In Islamabad, President Karzai pressed Pakistan hard to arrange meetings with Taliban leaders, including Sirajuddin Haqqani.

Washington is against any official Afghan contact with Haqqani — a fact known to both Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Interestingly, Pakistan has agreed with the Afghan president to jointly convince the US not to oppose Pakistan-facilitated contacts with the Haqqani Network.

Likewise, Pakistan also needs to understand the mindset of the Taliban, particularly its reclusive leader Mullah Mohammad Omar, who will never negotiate any peace pact with the Karzai regime. The Taliban are convinced Karzai is a weak man, totally dependent on the US and unable to take independent decisions. This fact is evident from the performance of the High Council for Peace that has failed to establish contact with the Taliban.

Also, Pakistan does not enjoy past prestige in the eyes of the Taliban because of its perceived betrayals of the militia. This time, the Taliban will not do Pakistan’s bidding so easily. In the prevailing circumstances, if the Taliban ever want to participate in any peace process, they will prefer to do that directly with the US.

Then, there are people in the Karzai administration that ascended the ladder of power overnight in post-Taliban Kabul. This group, comprising former Pakhtun warlords and ethnic Tajiks, is against any power-sharing with the Taliban. Facing tough opposition from within, the weak and indecisive Hamid Karzai will never choose to share power with his Popalzai cousin, Mullah Omar.

The Karzai regime fears that in case of any rapprochement, the US and international forces will leave Afghanistan while the Taliban will stay back with an exalted sense of victory over the sole superpower.

Pakistan should wait and observe how others i.e. the Taliban, the US and the Afghan government, are repositioning themselves in the emerging scenario. There are some noticeable changes in US policy towards the Taliban, such as referring to the militia by its name and not ‘terrorists’ or ‘insurgents’. This gives the impression of acceptance as a future political force.

Washington has also shown further seriousness in a political settlement to the conflict when, after the death of Richard Holbrooke, Mark Grossman — known as ‘Mr Reconciliation’ — was appointed as special envoy for Pakistan and Afghanistan and brought changes in the administration by replacing the hard-line ambassador to Kabul, Gen Karl W. Eikenberry, with a much more amiable Ryan C. Crocker.

The Karzai government has also realised, though late, that the policy of ‘reintegration’ of the Taliban’s lower cadres is wrong and needs to be discarded. It has now decided to focus on making direct contacts with the real leadership of the Taliban.

Pakistan also needs to study cautiously the extraordinary rush of the US and President Karzai towards Islamabad for approaching the Taliban. Both Washington and Kabul believe that following Osama bin Laden’s elimination inside Pakistan, Islamabad is under tremendous pressure and they can extract more from it.

Moreover, the US and President Karzai want to finish the job as early as possible. Obama wants to cash it in for the upcoming presidential elections, while Karzai wants the job done before 2014, when his second term in office expires.

On the contrary, there is no rush on part of the Taliban. They are giving a persistently tough fight to the war-weary US and international forces. Currently, the Taliban are riding high and bringing them to the table to negotiate is a tough task indeed.

Read more: http://trifter.com/asia-pacific/afghanistan/engaging-the-taliban/#ixzz1QNTUrSJR